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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-5485
________________
DAVYED WOODARD,
                                               Appellant
v.
PHB DIE CASTING
                                                                           
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00141-E)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
                                                                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 2, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed :  November 6, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Dayved Woodard appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of his former employer, PHB Die Casting, on charges of employment discrimination in
violation of federal and state law.  
Woodard worked at defendant PHB Die Casting’s facility in Fairview,
2Pennsylvania, from 1998 through 2003.  He contends that during that time, he
experienced and heard second-hand about a number of allegedly racist comments by co-
workers and that he was given less favorable job assignments than non-African American
employees.  Specifically, he testified at his deposition: that he saw a burning cross and
KKK sign drawn on a bathroom wall in 2002, and that management failed to have it
removed for at least three months after he reported it (Woodard Tr. at 67-72); that his
supervisor consistently gave him more physically demanding tasks at more complex
machines (Woodard Tr. at 83-93); that he was told by co-workers about blatantly racist
comments that had been made by other co-workers (Woodard Tr. at 33-41); and that more
ambiguously racially charged comments were directed to him by co-workers (Woodard
Tr. at 47-49).  In addition, Woodard introduced evidence that a supervisor at PHB’s
Fairview facility agreed to attend diversity training in response to complaints in 2001 but
never actually attended the class.  See EEOC Determination of December 18, 2003.  The
District Court found this evidence insufficient to establish a prima facie case for either a
hostile work environment or disparate treatment claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., or the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 951 et seq.
We agree.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and undertake plenary
review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  See Cardenas v. Massey, 269
F.3d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact to be resolved at trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
3a matter of law.  See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In making the determination, all
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.  See Cardenas, 269
F.3d at 254.
In order to establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim under Title VII
or the PHRA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the employee suffered intentional
discrimination because of [his race], (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular, (3)
the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, (4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same [race] in that position, and (5) the
existence of respondeat superior liability.”  Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426
(3d Cir. 2001).  The discriminatory conduct must be so extreme as to amount to a change
in the terms and conditions of employment.  See Carver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243,
262 (3d Cir. 2005).  Unless they are extremely severe, offhand comments and isolated
incidents are insufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim.  See id.  
Like the District Court, we find no evidence to support Woodard’s conclusion that
any unfavorable work assignments resulted from racial animus.  Rather, Woodard
testified at his deposition that any animosity on the part of the supervisor responsible for
work assignments arose from a 1998 incident that had nothing to do with Woodard’s race. 
See Woodard Tr. at 98.
What remains are the racist graffiti and the racially insensitive comments made to
     1  The more serious racist comments that were made outside of Woodard’s presence
and directed at others do not serve as direct evidence in support of his hostile work
environment claim, but they may be relevant to determining whether otherwise
ambiguous comments or conduct was racially motivated.  See Carver, 420 F.3d at 263-64.
     2 Appellant’s motion to file a supplemental appendix and to supplement the District
Court record is DENIED.  See In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 317 n.32 (3d
Cir. 2005) (noting that our review is confined to the record built by the District Court).
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Woodard by his co-workers.1  Over the course of three years, Woodard claims that he was
twice asked questions using the phrase “you people,” once asked what his race was, and
once asked if he intended to complete a drug deal during a bathroom break.  Even
assuming these somewhat ambiguous incidents were related to Woodard’s race, they are
the type of offhand comments that are insufficient to support a hostile work environment
claim.  See Carver, 420 F.3d at 263.  While the KKK-related graffiti and PHB’s alleged
failure to remove it promptly are more serious, this one incident, even in conjunction with
the comments discussed above, is not enough for a trier of fact to conclude that
discriminatory conduct in the workplace amounted to a change in the terms or conditions
of Woodard’s employment.
As the District Court noted, Woodard failed to make out a prima facie disparate
treatment claim because he did not introduce evidence that he was subject to an adverse
employment action.  See Sarullo v. USPS, 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.2
